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“I wasn’t articulate enough to have the country 
understand that we weren’t in a recession, that  
we were in a rather booming economy in the  
last half of my Presidency.”
(George H. W. Bush, Academy of Achievement 
interview, 2 June 1995)
Introduction
When running for reelection in the 1992 US presidential 
election, George Bush, Sr was right to complain that the 
economy was better than the media was reporting, for it may 
have been the media’s portrayal of the economy, rather than 
economic performance itself, that cost him reelection 
(Hetherington, 1996). The media reports were simply 
reflecting initial official economic estimates that would sub-
sequently be revised upwards, in the case of second quarter 
growth, by a factor of five. Curiously, despite evidence of 
the media’s role in forming voters’ impressions of the econ-
omy, nearly all fundamentals-based election forecasts and 
scholarly work on the relationship between objective eco-
nomic performance and the pro-incumbent vote rely on 
revised economic figures that have been repeatedly updated 
since the initial real-time estimates that dominate economic 
reporting.1 When employing revised economic data in esti-
mating economic effects on the vote, scholars implicitly, 
and, we argue, mistakenly, assume that it is the actual state 
of the economy rather than the economy represented in the 
media that influences the vote.
The economy plays a central role in explaining and pre-
dicting electoral outcomes. The economic vote is one of the 
most researched (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2000), if not fully understood (Anderson, 
2007, Kayser, 2014), phenomena in electoral politics. 
When predicting elections, the economy is no less impor-
tant. Nearly all structural forecasting models include the 
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economy in some way.2 In the PS October 2012 special 
issue on election forecasting, for example, 11 of 13 models 
employed the economy with growth rates being the most 
commonly used measure. Despite its importance, however, 
we know surprisingly little about how economic variation 
actually influences voting decisions. While scholars have 
addressed the question of how subjective economic percep-
tions influence vote choice (Healy and Malhotra, 2013; 
Wlezien et al., 1997), they have devoted less effort to 
understanding how voters form these economic perceptions 
in the first place. Do voters directly experience change in 
economic variables? Or do they learn about them from the 
media?
Some early research on the economic vote explicitly 
stated the assumption that voters directly experience the 
economy (Fair, 1982; Fiorina, 1981) but most subsequent 
studies simply left this as an unstated assumption. Those 
scholars who have explicitly searched for media effects on 
economic perceptions have nonetheless often found note-
worthy relationships associating media coverage of the 
economy with the generalization of personal economic 
events (Mutz 1992), negativity bias (Soroka, 2006), bench-
marking against other economies (Kayser and Peress, 
2012), future economic performance (Soroka et al.,2014) 
and amplified effects for some economic aggregates but not 
others (Kayser and Peress, 2015). Indeed, media coverage 
of the economy may yield voting effects beyond those of 
the economy itself (Nadeau et al., 1994). Such results buoy 
research on whether and how political campaigns, which 
work at least partly through the media, matter (Gelman and 
King, 1993; Wlezien and Erikson, 2002). They also support 
arguments for the use of perceived rather than objective 
economic measures (Stevenson and Duch, 2013). We argue 
here that they also bear implications for election 
forecasting.
The question of how voters learn about the economy 
underlies a fundamental decision that empirical researchers 
rarely consider. Scholars usually employ economic data 
maintained and distributed by government agencies or 
international organizations that have been repeatedly and 
often dramatically revised since their initial release: the 
release that receives the most attention in the press. If vot-
ers learn about the economy from direct experience, then 
using revised economic estimates is indeed, albeit unwit-
tingly, correct since revised economic figures more accu-
rately reflect the true state of the economy. If, however, 
voters learn about the economy from the media, then the 
initial economic reports, the real-time data, offer the most 
relevant economic information.
We embrace this distinction, not only to investigate the 
consequences of data vintage on forecasting, but also as an 
opportunity to test how voters learn about the economy. We 
replicate four forecasting models for US presidential elec-
tions with both vintage and real-time data. Our results 
reveal that revised data are not better data when it comes to 
capturing the underlying data generating process associated 
with voting. Despite more accurate estimation of economic 
conditions, revised economic figures are poorer predictors 
of out-of-sample election outcomes. We first demonstrate a 
significant positive relationship between the number of 
economic data revisions and absolute forecasting error. We 
then compare forecasting models that are fit with real-time 
data to current practice, which attenuates differences by 
using real-time data for the single out-of-sample election 
year prediction (but revised data for fitting the model). 
Models that are fit on both types of data yield similarly 
sized prediction errors but the advantage of real-time data 
seems to grow with time. As economic time series get 
longer, the average number of data revisions rises and the 
performance of most-recent vintage data relative to real-
time data deteriorates, despite the additional degrees of 
freedom. All four models show a trend toward greater abso-
lute prediction errors from models fit following current 
practice. This is what we would expect if voters learn about 
the economy from the media.
Revisions and their implications
Economic data are frequently revised. The US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) usually publishes a first esti-
mate of quarterly economic data 1–2 months after the end 
of each quarter. The BEA then revises this estimate in sub-
sequent issues of the Survey of Current Business (SCB). 
Initial estimates are almost always revised but older data 
also do not escape change. Even economic estimates for 
quarters that are years or decades in the past can still be 
revised. Economists are conscious of these frequent and 
substantial data revisions and their implications for eco-
nomic forecasts (Croushore and Stark, 2003; Runkle, 
1998). Election forecasters, less so.
What do economic data revisions mean for election 
forecasting models? The relevance of data revisions might 
not be apparent in a single forecast of a given election. Such 
a forecast, say in 1992 for that year’s election, would use 
the same 1992 data to calculate the forecast that the BEA 
initially published and that the media and, therefore, voters 
relied on. When forecasting the subsequent 1996 election, 
however, forecasters would use an updated time series of 
growth rates. That time series would not only contain up-
to-date growth rates for the years between 1992 and 1996 
but also revised growth rates for 1992 and prior years. An 
out-of-sample forecast for the 1992 election conducted in 
1996 therefore delivers a different forecast than the original 
1992 forecast. This principle applies to any election and 
chances are that the error in subsequent out-of-sample fore-
casts, despite using generally improved estimates of eco-
nomic performance, will be greater. We discuss this issue in 
greater details below.
If revisions to estimates of economic aggregates were 
minor, then this issue would be trivial. Revisions, however, 
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are both common and substantial. The difference in macro-
economic estimates between revised and original data vin-
tages can commonly be over 100 per cent (two-fold). Figure 
1 illustrates this with economic growth estimates for our 
running example, the 1992 presidential election. Presidential 
forecasters usually use second quarter data so that they can 
release a forecast in July or August for the November elec-
tion. Growth estimates for the second quarter of 1992, how-
ever, have changed from a sclerotic (0.8) per cent in the 
initial BEA release to well over 4 (4.3) per cent in the 2014 
revision, an increase by a factor of 5.4, belatedly proving 
George H. W. Bush right.
Although revisions in our output growth example from 
1992 are larger than most, they are also not extreme outli-
ers. In our data used in the Abramowitz model, for exam-
ple, the mean absolute deviation for the Q2 on Q1 growth 
rate from the first estimate released in August of every elec-
tion year to the 2012 August estimate for all forecasted 
elections (since 1984) is 1.52 percentage points (with a 
standard deviation of 1.25). Moreover, revisions in expan-
sions differ substantially from those in recessions 
(Croushore, 2011: Table 3) and, as noted in the case of real 
output growth by Stevenson and Duch (2013), changes do 
not cancel out because of a preponderance of upward 
revisions.
Making the choice of which data release to use is impor-
tant for both the theoretical fidelity and empirical perfor-
mance of a model. Most election forecasts, with the 
possible exception of James E. Campbell (Campbell, 2008; 
Campbell and Wink, 1990), ignore the implications of data 
vintage and simply employ the most recently distributed 
data vintage, without even being aware that they are mak-
ing a modeling decision.3,4 If voters indeed respond to the 
real state of the economy, this decision, though unwitting, 
is nevertheless correct. If voters respond to media report-
ing on the initial economic data releases, however, then 
failing to use “real-time” data to fit forecasting models 
introduces prediction error and slippage between theory 
and empirics.
The models
We investigate the effect of data revisions by employing 
both vintage and real-time data to replicate three prominent 
forecasting models for US presidential elections and a 
generic model that we developed, based on findings from 
Healy and Lenz (2014). The three established models are 
Lewis-Beck and Tien’s “Core Model”, Abramowitz’s 
“Time for Change” model and Campbell’s “Trial-Heat” 
model. To these we add our own “End-Heuristic” model 
that captures features common to structural forecasting 
models. All of these models are fit with ordinary least 
squares (OLS), predict the incumbent share of the two-
party vote share and are parsimonious by necessity, as the 
number of post-WWII presidential elections is small. We 
collected all data from original sources, so small differ-
ences in our results to those presented by the authors of the 
models might emerge. Election data were obtained from the 
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives; the eco-
nomic data produced by the BEA were collected from the 
Federal Reserve’s ALFRED and the Real-Time Data Set for 
Macroeconomists databases. The first-term incumbent 
dummy was coded based on the description provided in 
Abramowitz (2012).
1. The Lewis-Beck and Tien model is the longest-run-
ning that we replicate. The model has changed fre-
quently over the years as Lewis-Beck and Tien 
(2008) themselves document. We estimate a “core 
model” that they present in their 2008 article. As 
with all of the forecasting models that we replicate, 
Lewis-Beck and Tien use economic growth data as 
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Figure 1. Revisions in Growth Rate Estimate for 1992 Q2. The figure plots all monthly vintages of the quarter-on-quarter growth 
rate for the second quarter of 1992 since the release of the first estimate in August 1992.
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a predictor, which they calculate as change from Q4 
of the year before election to Q2 of the election year 
at annualized rates. The other key predictor is presi-
dential popularity, as measured by the percentage of 
respondents approving of the job the president is 
doing in the first Gallup poll in July before the elec-
tion. For election years for which no early July poll 
was available we used the poll closest to July that 
was taken before late August when second quarter 
economic data became available.
2. Abramowitz’s “Time for Change” basic model has 
also undergone revisions. We estimate a basic model 
from Abramowitz (2012). Thus, as a measure of pres-
idential popularity, we use net presidential approval, 
the difference between the share of respondents 
approving and disapproving of the job the president is 
doing. The approval data are taken from the final 
Gallup poll in June prior to the election. The growth 
rate was calculated as annualized change from the 
first to the second quarter of the election year. We, 
like Abramowitz, also include a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the first-term incumbent ran.
3. The Campbell “Trial-Heat” model employs two 
variables: a preference poll and economic growth. 
Campbell (2012) uses the two-party share for the 
incumbent from the Gallup preference poll in early 
September of the election year. Output growth from 
the first to the second quarter of the election year is 
the second variable. It is calculated as the difference 
between the actual growth rate and a “neutral point” 
growth rate of 2.5% which is divided in half in the 
case of incumbent party candidates other than the 
president. From 1992 on, Campbell uses real GNP 
or GDP.
4. Our End-Heuristic model captures the features 
common to most presidential forecasting models in 
their simplest forms. We use two variables. 
Presidential popularity is the same measure as used 
by Lewis-Beck and Tien. Output growth differs 
from the other models. It is the weighted average of 
quarterly growth rates in GNP or GDP from the first 
quarter of the year before the election to the second 
quarter of the election year.5 Each quarter receives 
double the weight of the preceding quarter, which 
allocates 76% of the overall weight to the election 
year and 24% to the pre-election year. This approach 
corresponds to the finding of Healy and Lenz (2014) 
who find a weight of 3/4 for the election year.6
Data constraints ruled out two other prominent fore-
casting models. Fair (1978) employs a larger specification 
and a longer time series reaching back to 1918, well before 
the beginning of real-time records. We could re-run Fair’s 
model using data from 1948 to 2012 but that would leave 
us with one degree of freedom for our first forecast (1984) 
and still only eight for our 2012 forecast. Hibbs (2000) 
uses US military fatalities in foreign wars and a weighted 
average of real disposable income per capita over the pres-
idential term. Disposable personal income data goes back 
to 1947 but the only real-time CPI measure that goes back 
nearly far enough, to 1949, is limited to urban wage earn-
ers and clerical workers, i.e. 32% of the population.7
How accurate are the models that we do replicate? 
Figure 2 presents the out-of-sample forecasting errors in all 
presidential elections for all four models. We begin in 1984 
both because it is one of the first elections preceded by 
enough post-WWII elections to support a simple model 
(1948 is our first observation) and because it was the first 
presidential election to be de facto forecasted (Lewis-Beck 
and Rice, 1984). The forecasting models are fit only on 
observations preceding the predicted election and use the 
August 2012 economic data vintage. As Figure 2 shows, all 
four models perform reasonably well.
Is newer data better data?
Revised economic data presumedly improve the measure-
ment of macroeconomic performance but their predictive 
validity for voting depends on whether voters respond to the 
actual state of the economy or to its presentation in the 
media. Real-time data offer the opportunity to test, if indi-
rectly, the means by which economic voters acquire infor-
mation about the economy and thereby not only improve 
theory, but also forecasting and modeling practices. Since 
real-time data are reported in the media more than revisions, 
better prediction using real-time (relative to revised) data 
would suggest that media reporting on the economy influ-
ences voters’ economic perceptions. In contrast, if revised 
vintages perform best, we can infer that voters are most 
affected by the real state of the economy, likely through 
direct experience of economic events. Figure 3, using real-
time and 2012 vintages, demonstrates that even the growth 
estimates used in our four forecasting models differ appreci-
ably. Real-time data explain only between 71 and 86 per 
cent of the variance in 2012-vintage growth data.
These differences matter for model fit. Table 1 illustrates 
this with a comparison of point estimates on economic 
growth when predicting incumbent share of the two-party 
vote for each of our four forecasting models. Coefficient 
magnitudes differ by between 6.2 and 17.4 per cent.
We see that initial and revised economic estimates differ 
and yield subsequent differences in model fit but the question 
of whether data revisions improve election forecasts remains. 
By repeatedly forecasting a given election outcome from dif-
ferent data vintages, we should be able to see whether the later 
vintages improve election forecasts. Figure 4 plots out the 
absolute prediction errors for all elections since 1984 for each 
of our forecasting models at each election year since the origi-
nal. The first forecast for each election uses, of course, real-
time growth data available the summer before the election. 
Each subsequent “forecast” of the same election uses the vin-
tage available at the date of each later forecast. Thus, the 
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Figure 2. Four models. Forecasting error (in percentage points) for each model in each election, 1984–2012, i.e. the difference 
between out-of-sample forecast and election result, for out-of-sample forecasts of the 1984–2012 elections using August 2012 
economic data vintage.
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Figure 3. Four models, with 2012 vintage plotted against real-time growth estimates. The 45° line indicates perfect correspondence 
between vintage and real-time estimates. Points above the line indicate that newer estimates have revised growth estimates upwards 
from the original estimate.
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plotted point for the 1984 election at the x-axis tick for 2008 
records the out-of-sample prediction error of the 1984 election 
results using the BEA’s 2008 vintage time series for economic 
growth for election years from 1948 up to 1984. Thus, the only 
change from the original 1984 forecast is the economic data on 
which the forecast model is estimated and predicted.
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Figure 4. Absolute forecasting error across different vintages. The first observation in each series represents real-time data.
Table 1. OLS model estimates using real-time and 2012 vintage data for each forecasting model. The percentage differences in 
the Growth coefficients represent the change from the 2012 vintage data to real-time data. The Growth variable is operationalized 
differently for each of the four models, as explained in Section 3 of the manuscript. Standard errors in parentheses.
Lewis-Beck and Tien Abramowitz Campbell End-heuristic
 Vintage Real-time Vintage Real-time Vintage Real-time Vintage Real-time
Constant 36.06*** 36.33*** 47.78*** 47.33*** 31.46*** 30.26*** 36.12*** 36.06***
 (2.774) (3.051) (1.094) (1.186) (5.694) (4.721) (2.752) (2.895)
JulyPopularity 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.27*** 0.277***
 (0.0587) (0.0669) (0.0595) (0.0626)
NetApproval 0.121*** 0.111**  
 (0.0259) (0.0273)  
Term1Incumb 3.016* 3.624 *  
 (1.322) (1.344)  
EarlySeptPoll 0.371**
(0.107)
0.394***
(0.0881)
 
 
EconGrowth 1.174* 0.970 0.464* 0.520* 0.581* 0.686** 0.682* 0.589
 (0.493) (0.620) (0.156) (0.178) (0.231) (0.191) (0.279) (0.289)
Coeff Diff 17.4% 12.1% 6.2% 13.6%
R2 0.757 0.707 0.834 0.832 0.695 0.774 0.761 0.736
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
*p <0.05, **p <0.01 ***, p<0.001.
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The results in Figure 4 suggest a positive trend, on aver-
age, in absolute prediction error as the number of revisions 
to a time-series increases. To be more certain and also to 
estimate the magnitude of any trend, we estimate effect 
sizes. Table 2 regresses “forecast error deviations”, the dif-
ference between each vintage’s absolute forecast error and 
that from predictions generated with the election year vin-
tage (“most recent vintage”), on vintage number. Since vin-
tage changes also occur in non-election years, we also 
include years in which no election occurred, up to the most 
recently available 2014 vintage. By definition, the devia-
tion in vintage year zero (“most recent vintage”) from itself 
is zero. We specify the model without a constant precisely 
to fit our regression through the origin, thereby estimating 
later vintage change from the initial absolute forecasting 
error.
All four models show a positive effect of data vintage on 
error size, three of them statistically significant. The Lewis-
Beck and Tien model stands out for the size of its effect. 
Using a data vintage from 10 years after the election results 
in a forecasting error that is on average four tenths of a 
percentage point greater than the error obtained when using 
the vintage available prior to the election. The Abramowitz 
model, in contrast, finds no effect at all but even here abso-
lute forecasting error increased after the first vintage for all 
but two elections (1988 and 2004).
Simulated practice
The previous section demonstrated that later vintages intro-
duce greater forecasting error. In practice, however, forecast-
ers follow two conventions that may reduce vintage effects. 
They usually choose the most recent vintage of economic 
data for their models. While these data have still undergone 
revisions since their first release, they have undergone fewer 
updates than we document above. For this reason, most-
recent-vintage data should yield smaller differences from 
forecasts with real-time data. Moreover, practitioners only 
use revised data to fit their models but then employ the real-
time economic figure for the present election year to calcu-
late their forecast. When considered together, one should 
expect the difference to shrink further. This section compares 
real-time forecasts to actual practice.
Consider the choices that researchers, to stick with our 
example, would likely make in forecasting the 1992 US 
presidential election. These forecasters, working in the 
summer of 1992, would obtain the latest vintage of eco-
nomic data from the BEA or elsewhere and, together with 
data on presidential popularity and possibly other variables, 
fit a model. Taking the point estimates from this model, 
they would then plug in the most recently released popular-
ity and economic growth figures to get their forecast. Their 
forecast only uses vintage data for fitting the model, not for 
the second step in which they place the real-time (1992) 
values in the model to get their forecast. All differences that 
we observe between forecasts based on real-time data and 
most-recent-vintage data come from the first step in which 
the model is fit. When time series are short, as is the case 
with elections in the 1980s, we expect greater forecasting 
error simply due to small samples; but we also expect to see 
little advantage for real-time data since the number of revi-
sions in a short time series is modest.
Table 3 demonstrates this result.8 We assess the predic-
tive quality of the four models on the basis of multiple syn-
thetic out-of-sample forecasts making forward predictions 
of election outcomes. We fit each forecasting model for 
each election with three data vintages: (1) the 2012 vintage, 
the election year closest to the authorship date of this arti-
cle; (2) the “most recent vintage”, i.e. that data that an elec-
tion forecaster would use in each election year when 
forecasting that year’s election; and (3) real-time data that 
excludes all revisions. Since we are simulating actual prac-
tice with the “most recent vintage” data, we plug (real-time) 
economic measures from the quarters preceding each elec-
tion into each fit model, consistent with the model descrip-
tions above, to derive each forecast. Forecasts using the 
2012 vintage, in contrast, use the 2012 vintage estimates 
both for model fit and for the quarters before each election. 
Real-time forecasts, of course, use real-time estimates for 
all economic data, for both model fit and forecasting.
We average the forecasting errors for each type of data 
for each model across all forecasted elections in four differ-
ent ways. Table 3 reports the mean absolute error (MAE) 
and the root mean squared error (RMSE), both unweighted 
and weighted by degrees of freedom, for all elections, mod-
els and types of data. The degrees of freedom (df) weights 
Table 2. Deviations in absolute forecasting error from election-year forecasting error as function of data vintage, measured as the 
number of years since the election. OLS without constant. Standard errors, clustered on election, in parentheses.
Lewis-Beck & Tien Abramowitz Campbell End-heuristic
Vintage Number 0.0397* 0.0127 0.0358* 0.0274*
 (0.0149) (0.0192) (0.0110) (0.0108)
R2 0.473 0.066 0.489 0.397
N 128 128 128 128
Standard errors in parentheses
*p <0.05, **p <0.01 ***, p<0.001.
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account for the fact that more recent elections enjoy longer 
time-series. As expected, forecasting error, regardless of 
how it is averaged, is systematically larger using the 2012 
vintage of economic data. This reflects the fact that the eco-
nomic measures used for both the model fit and forecast 
were repeatedly revised. More interestingly, from the per-
spective of evaluating actual practice, the differences 
between forecasts based on most recent data vintage and 
real-time data are much smaller. Indeed, on balance, it is 
difficult to discern whether one type of data generates 
smaller forecast errors than the other. Models using growth 
as the only predictor produce similar results, as shown in 
Section 6 of the online appendix.
One could interpret these results as an endorsement for the 
status quo methods of data selection. Such a conclusion, how-
ever, might be overly hasty. As time series get longer they 
should include estimates of economic performance for ever 
more distant election years with ever more revisions. The 
absolute deviation between initial output estimates and vin-
tage estimates grows with the number of revisions, as we show 
in the online appendix. Moreover, these deviations do not can-
cel each other out with mean revisions tending to be positive 
(Aruoba, 2008). Estimates of aggregate output increase, on 
average, by 0.52 per cent between the initial release and the 
latest available data (Croushore, 2011: p. 81, Table 3).9 Given 
that estimates of the economic vote, to take a recent example, 
associate a one point increase in output with between a 0.8 and 
1.4 point increase in the incumbent party vote share (Becher 
and Donnelly, 2013), deviations of this magnitude can have 
notable effects in forecast accuracy. Longer time-series with 
greater deviations from initial economic estimates then sug-
gest increasingly inaccurate forecasting models.
Precisely such a trend appears to be emerging in our 
models. Figure 5 plots the difference in absolute forecasting 
errors between the real-time and most-recent vintage, with 
negative values indicating greater error in forecasts based 
on most-recent-vintage data. Differences between forecasts 
based on the two types of data have declined over time. Of 
greater interest is the trend toward greater forecasting error 
with most-recent vintage economic data (actual practice) 
shown as negative values in Figure 5. These results, signifi-
cant in two of the four models, are too preliminary to be 
anything more than suggestive. Nevertheless, in precisely 
those models, the Lewis-Beck and Tien and end-heuristic 
models, where the result in Table 2 and Figure 4 suggest the 
largest increase in forecasting error from vintage revisions, 
we also see the strongest evidence of growing forecast errors 
with most-recent-vintage data. Section 4 demonstrated that 
forecast error increases with vintage. Figure 5 suggests that 
time-series are becoming sufficiently long for these model 
fitting effects to emerge with most-recent-vintage data.
Conclusion
We have systematically compared the predictions of four 
forecasting models using real-time and vintage data over 
numerous presidential elections in the United States. Our 
results demonstrate that later vintages introduce greater 
forecasting error and suggest that error magnitude should 
increase under current forecasting practices as time series 
get longer and the average number of revisions to the data 
increases. Although revised macroeconomic data may 
measure the state of the economy better (Croushore, 2011), 
they predict electoral outcomes less well. This finding sug-
gests, indirectly, that voters respond more to initial eco-
nomic estimates, that are heavily reported in the media, 
than to the economy itself. It also strengthens the argument 
for subjective economic measures in studies of the 
Table 3. Mean errors across models and vintages.
MAE RMSE MAE (df) RMSE (df)
 Lewis-Beck & Tien
2012 vintage 2.27 2.79 2.27 2.76
most recent vintage 1.79 2.5 1.86 2.55
real-time 1.78 2.68 1.71 2.6
 Abramowitz
2012 vintage 2.54 3.09 2.37 2.96
most recent vintage 2.24 2.78 2.05 2.62
real-time 2.27 2.85 2.04 2.64
 Campbell
2012 vintage 2.96 4.14 2.96 4.02
most recent vintage 2.48 3.71 2.54 3.64
real-time 2.46 3.49 2.51 3.44
 End-heuristic model
2012 vintage 2.01 2.82 2.04 2.83
most recent vintage 1.58 2.58 1.62 2.62
real-time 1.67 2.75 1.61 2.71
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economic vote (Stevenson and Duch, 2013). Indeed, we 
can expect that the effect of data revisions on economic 
voting results are even greater than those for forecasting. 
Unlike forecasting with most recent data vintages, which 
fits the model on vintage data but uses the most recent (i.e. 
real-time) data for the forecast, economic voting usually 
only fits vintage data.
We conclude with one broader point about forecasting. 
We have focused on predictive validity but model stability is 
also a critical criterion for evaluating a forecasting model 
over time. Campbell (2014: p.302) argues that an “unchanged 
and fairly accurate forecasting model should be considered 
more credible than a one-hit wonder or frequently tweaked 
model”. Election forecasters frequently change their mod-
els, most often by adjusting their measures of presidential 
approval or of economic growth. The use of vintage data, 
we argue, raises the likelihood of such model revisions. 
When a new model outperforms the old model in out-of-
sample forecasts of the past election, forecasters are wont to 
adjust their model. When preparing a new forecast, how-
ever, they introduce not only a new observation but a com-
pletely new time series. Thus, model changes justified by an 
improved fit to the “new information”, the new election in 
the time series, are, in fact, fit on revised economic esti-
mates, muddying the source of any “improvements”.
The implications of data revisions for macroeconomic 
forecasting have received considerable attention in eco-
nomics. While economists rely on data revision to improve 
their economic forecasts, election forecasters and scholars 
working on the economic vote might be better off ignoring 
these revisions and using unrevised real-time data.
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Notes
1. See Campbell (2008); Campbell and Wink (1990) for inter-
esting exceptions.
2. In the PS October 2012 special issue on election forecasting, 
for example, 11 of 13 models employed the economy with 
growth rates being the most commonly used measure.
3. For a post-hoc “forecast” of the 1988 US presidential election 
and a forecast of the 2008 election he uses, as best we can infer, 
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Figure 5. Real-time versus vintage data: forecasting errors in comparison. Difference in forecasting error between out-of-sample 
forecasts using election year vintage data and real-time data for elections 1984–2012. Negative values indicate greater error in 
forecasts based on most-recent-vintage data (actual practice). Regression line based on bivariate OLS model (significant coefficients 
indicated by solid line).
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real-time data, while for the 2004 election he seems to use the 
common approach of last-vintage data (Campbell, 2004).
4. Stevenson and Duch (2013), p.310), for example, could not 
identify a single article in which real-time economic data was 
used as a predictor of the vote.
5. The real-time data time series for our end-heuristic model 
omit elections preceding 1960. There are no coherent data 
in this period available from the SCB. Nevertheless, the 
accuracy of models using real-time data, although fitted on a 
shorter time-series, compares rather favorably against mod-
els fitted on longer vintage data time series.
6. An alternative is offered by Wlezien (2015) who also finds 
that economic performance in the last 2 years of a presiden-
tial term influences the vote, albeit more proportionally.
7. Our online appendix offers a more complete explanation plus 
an application of the Hibbs weighting scheme to different data.
8. For each out-of-sample forecast we use real-time data and 
the vintage time series published in August prior to the elec-
tion (the first time an estimate of GDP in the second quarter 
of the election year which all models rely on is available). As 
reporting of real GNP only began after the 1956 election we 
use nominal GNP for earlier elections to create a real-time 
time series that goes all of the way back to 1948. Thus, our 
real-time data time series contains growth rates based on real 
GDP, real GNP and nominal GNP. As perceptions can only 
be based on information available at the time our real-time 
variables is the best possibly proxy for perceptions of the 
economy.
9. Interestingly, especially for George H. W. Bush, initial esti-
mates also tend to underestimate the depth of recessions and 
the strength of recoveries (Abo-Zaid, 2014; Croushore, 2011).
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